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An underground gold war in Colombia is ‘a ticking ecological time bomb’

  • In Colombia’s Buriticá municipality, a gold mine owned by Chinese company Zijin has become a hotspot of environmental damage, criminal activity and conflict.
  • Zijin announced earlier this year that it had lost control of 60% of its mining operations to the illegal miners, who have taken over the mine’s tunnels or collapsed them.
  • Illegal mining has expanded in and around the mine, with miners using mercury, explosives and heavy machinery to extract gold, contaminating ecosystems and threatening the geological stability of the area.
  • The illegal miners flock here from around the country, and are associated with the Gaitanista Army of Colombia (EGC), also known as the Gulf Clan, Colombia’s largest criminal armed group.

Nearly 100 underground tunnels, running a combined length of more than 84 kilometers, or 52 miles, crisscross and plunge into the depths of the mountain that hosts the Zijin gold mine in Buriticá, northeastern Colombia. Since 2021, those tunnels have been invaded by informal miners associated with Colombia’s largest criminal armed group, the Gaitanista Army of Colombia (EGC), called the “Gulf Clan” by the government, who are digging their own honeycomb of tunnels into the same massive gold deposits.

Confrontations between the informal miners Zijin security personnel have at times escalated into underground gun battles. And as the mine acts as a magnet for increasing criminality, both social and environmental destruction have followed.

Residents describe the situation as “a ticking ecological time bomb.” Some say they worry that the thousands of poorly constructed tunnels built by the informal miners are in danger of collapsing the mountain entirely — a fear also expressed after investigations by the Mining, Environmental and Agrarian Office of Colombia’s Attorney General’s Office.

Concerns over contamination

In a public statement from July, the AGO warned that illegal mining is creating “grave environmental consequences” that include “structural geological risk to the base” of the mountain where the Zijin mine is located.

“All mining, legal or illegal, contributes to ecological damage, and potentially threatens water tables via underground aquifers, causes deforestation and in turn these phenomena threaten biodiversity,” Oscar Alejandro Pérez-Escobar, a Colombian researcher at the Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew, in the U.K., told Mongabay. “The region where Buriticá is located is among the most biodiverse in the Andes.”

But illegal mining is often more damaging than licensed commercial mining operations, because the miners don’t follow state-imposed practices that include basic ecological and safety guidelines, he said.

Mercury being used to agglomerate gold.
Mercury used to agglomerate gold has contaminated the local water table. Image by Fabio Nascimento.

Many of the informal mining operations that have sprung up around the mine use mercury as an agent to extract the gold deposits from the ore, as well as explosives to create tunnels or erode mountain faces, and heavy machinery to clear forest for strip-mining.

These illegal underground operations also damage the water table in the region through the use of chemicals and by leaving mining waste, or tailings, in poorly constructed tunnels that stretch deep into the mountain range in which they’re constructed.

“This is incredibly concerning,” Pérez-Escobar said, noting that any toxic materials left in the tunnels “will immediately end up in the water table. The tunnels are dug directly through natural subterranean aquifers in the mountains.”

“Heavy metals left over from mining, or used in mining processes, such as mercury, make their way up through the water table, into the food chain, and threaten flora and fauna alike,” he said. “This eventually becomes a poison for every living thing in the region.”

Mercury, which causes neurological damage in humans, including developmental problems in infants, has been detected in residents of other regions of Colombia where illegal mining has long been prevalent.

A 2017 study by the country’s environmental ministry in the municipalities of Segovia and Remedios found “high levels of mercury” in the breast milk of nearly 12% of lactating mothers. The government of Antioquia department, where the two municipalities are located, didn’t immediately respond to questions sent by Mongabay about whether similar studies had been conducted or were planned in Buriticá.

The Zijin mine operator has also been accused by the informal miners of intentionally dumping “toxic sludge” in tunnels in an attempt to deter illegal miners from entering. The operator has denied the accusations.

A growing minefield

The Zijin mine sits on the largest known gold deposit in South America,  an estimated reserve of more than 300 metric tons. The Chinese mining conglomerate that operates it calls it “ultra high-grade” and the country’s “first modern underground mine.”

But amid growing tensions with some local community members since the mine opened in 2020, the Chinese company has been the target of protests and road blockades by informal miners in the region.

The mine was initially built following surveying by Canada-based Continental Gold between 2016 and 2019, which discovered the gold deposits in Buriticá. In 2019, Zijin Mining Group, a multinational Chinese conglomerate, acquired 69.28% of Continental Gold’s shares and took over the Canadian company’s operations in Colombia.

Buriticá, Colombia, has seen a boom in mining, as it sits on the largest known gold deposit in South America. Image by Joshua Collins.

Juan Guillermo Pineda is a firefighter who has lived his whole life in Buriticá. “The illegal miners dump the bodies of those who die in the Zijin tunnels,” he told Mongabay over coffee in the idyllic town square. “They know they’ll be found there. So we come to pick them up, identify them, and then notify the families. If there are any families.”

Pineda adds that “We used to all be farmers here. But the kids here aren’t interested in that. Why would they want to poke around in the dirt when they earn 20 times as much looking for gold?”

Previously, the Gaitanistas didn’t have much of a presence in the municipality, despite having effective control over the region. But after Continental Gold’s discovery, things quickly began to change.

“A lot of people started arriving here from other mining regions in the country [in 2020],” said an activist and social leader who asked for anonymity, citing safety concerns. “People started to come here from dangerous places, like Segovia,” a mining town in northern Antioquia where the Gulf Clan maintains a strong presence. The region has a murder rate eight times higher than the national average.

“And now everyone has to pay EGC,” the activist said. “But the extortion isn’t the worst of it. Informal mining has exploded, and deaths have come with that.”

Zijin invested heavily in infrastructure and mining titles in the region. After operations became increasingly dangerous, in 2024 the company filed a lawsuit against the Colombian government. It sought $500 million in damages under Colombian-Canadian trade agreements, claiming Colombia had failed to guarantee basic security for its investment.

In June 2024, Zijin publicly declared it had lost control of more than 60% of its mining operation, as tunnels had been taken over or collapsed by informal miners, while two employees had been killed and dozens more injured. In the same statement, the company announced that it had recorded “2,260 explosions using improvised artifacts” and “a total of 2,450 shots fired” during confrontations with illegal miners within its tunnels in 2023.

“The Canadians dressed up the mine, claimed it was safe, and walked away with a nice paycheck,” said Luis, a mid-level manager for Zijin’s operations in Buriticá. He asked that his last name be withheld because he doesn’t have authorization to speak on behalf of the company. “It isn’t the Chinese company’s fault the problems started right afterward.”

Juan Pineda, a local firefighter, says that miners are working in dangerous, often deadly conditions. Image by Joshua Collins.

But Zijin’s lawsuit against Colombia is “unlikely to succeed,” said Adriaan Alsema, executive editor of South America-focused news portal Colombia Reports, who has reported on similar legal battles in the past. “The fact that Buriticá rests in a region firmly controlled by EGC is public knowledge. Government lawyers are likely to argue that it was a lack of due diligence on the part of the international conglomerate that is to blame, not Colombian security forces”

Alsema added that “No one is forcing the Zijin mining group to conduct operations here.”

Since 2020, when the Zijin mine opened, Colombian authorities have deployed 50 police from the National Unit Against Illegal Mining and Terrorism (UNMIL), who provide 24-hour security inside the mine, and hundreds of uniformed officers in the regions around Buriticá, where the illegal tunnel entrances are located.

“It hasn’t been enough,” said the activist. They added, however, that many of the informal miners being blamed for environmental and social problems are victims of the organized crime dynamic as well.

Most informal miners there are young and come to Buriticá from all over the country, searching for what seems to be a surefire way to make money.

“These kids are locked underground for weeks. They have no cellphone service, no entertainment,” the activist said. “So a lot of them turn to cocaine or other drugs to aid with the tedium of the work.”

They work shifts of 20 to 30 days locked in the tunnels. Although they can order food and even drugs from those who manage the illegal mining operation, they must pay out of their earnings.

“Some of them, if they’re unlucky, end up in debt,” the activist said.

But more often, miners who are paid based on the amount of ore they extract by the “investors” who oversee the illegal mines, can earn five to six times the monthly minimum wage in Colombia  —  currently around $360.

“Sometimes, if they strike a rich vein, they can make more though,” Pineda said. He described the work as incredibly dangerous, with workers drowning in floods in badly constructed tunnels, asphyxiated from a lack of proper ventilation, crushed by tunnel collapses that are either unprovoked or triggered by explosives used in mining operations.

“If someone is working in an adjacent illegal tunnel when Zijin workers are using explosives, it can burn all the oxygen in the air for hundreds of meters,” Pineda told Mongabay. “Informal miners have died not even realizing they are suffocating.”

For Luis, the Zijin mine manager, the solution is “a purge.” “Security forces need to clear out all of these strangers who come here and commit crimes. If Zijin leaves, the mine will just become even more of a magnet for armed groups,” he said.

But the activist said the solution isn’t that simple. “You can’t put these kids in jail for accepting an opportunity to improve their economic situation that they view as legitimate,” they said. “They are victims of the armed conflict as much as anyone else. And Zijin, despite their claims otherwise, knew the situation they were getting into.

“They just thought the profit would exceed the risk,” they added.

The departmental government and the Attorney General’s Office have launched programs in cooperation with Zijin to formalize illegal miners in the region, who must undergo environmental and safety training to be granted licenses.

Hugo Valle works as a subcontractor in the program to help the illegal miners enroll. “Mining has to be done in a responsible and sustainable manner,” he told Mongabay. “[President Gustavo] Petro has made environmentalism one of the primary goals of his administration, but we see no presence from the national government.

“Tons of illegal explosives and mercury are entering our town,” he added. “And this industry, carried out by thousands of [illegal] miners, also increases deforestation. They need wood to build their operations. We have already identified two species of trees near extinction that exist only in this region.”

Pérez-Escobar, the ecologist, spoke of a “strong link in Colombia between conflict and environmental destruction. Many times it is the human cost that is more visible,” he said.

“But environmental damage is often less immediately visible and may take decades to repair.”

Banner image: Buriticá is among the most diverse regions in the Andes. Image by Joshua Collins.

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The fuel that moves people: the Ecuadorian case

  • In Ecuador, the main areas of colonization were a north-south corridor along the base of the Andes and the Sucumbíos-Orellana quadrant, the country’s major oil-producing region.
  • Since the 1970s, populations in both areas have grown significantly. The Andean zone went from 160,000 inhabitants to more than 520,000 in 2017; in parallel, the population in the provinces of Sucumbíos and Orellana increased from less than 12,000 to more than 350,000.
  • Colonization also led to the invasion of lands of the indigenous Shuar, which prompted an unusual effort on their part to protect their territory. Today, the area specializes in cattle production and seeks to establish a niche market for high-quality beef for the domestic market.

Throughout most of the twentieth century, the Ecuadorian authorities pursued a geopolitical strategy that reflected a long-held conviction that they were cheated out of large territories in the Western Amazon. Most of their claims were adjudicated in favor of Peru and they were on the losing side of border disputes in 1860, 1903 and 1941. Consequently, successive governments were intent on not losing another square meter of what they fervently believed was their national territory, a policy that led to the construction of several highways and deliberate policies to foster migration into their lowland provinces.

Peru and Ecuador resolved their differences in 1998, after another border dispute, via an arbitration process coordinated by the governments of Brazil, Argentina, Chile and the United States. In the process, the countries established paired national parks on both sides of the border, and an ambitious IIRSA-sponsored initiative was launched to provide Ecuador with direct access to the Amazon waterway at Puerto Morona. The resolution of the border conflict and the much-improved transportation infrastructure opened up the Cordillera del Condor to large-scale mining operations operated by Canadian and Chinese corporations.

The road network in Amazonian Ecuador closely corresponds to the petroleum pipeline system, partly because the government promoted settlement along service roads during the 1970s. Data sources: GEM (2023) and RAISG (2022).

Migratory pathways

Migration into Amazonian Ecuador has occurred via four highway routes that connect urban centers in the Andes with a town or small city in the lowlands; from north to south, they include Quito to Nueva Loja (E10), Ambato to Puyo (E30), Cuenca to Macas (E40) and Loja to Zamora (E45). These roads channeled migrants into two major colonization landscapes: a north-south corridor along the base of the Andes, and the Sucumbíos-Orellana quadrant, which is also the country’s primary oil-producing region. The population along the piedmont grew from about 160,000 inhabitants in 1970 to more than 520,000 by 2017; simultaneously, the inhabitants of the Sucumbíos and Orellana provinces increased from fewer than 12,000 to more than 350,000.

Most communication was up and down mountain valleys between individual highland and lowland population centers, but eventually these communities were linked by a rudimentary north-south highway (Route 45). Multiple roads extended east into the Amazon lowlands, including one along the border to Tiwinza, a military post on the Santiago River, and an alternative route from the north to connect with Puerto Morona on the Morona River.

This latter route caused significant encroachment by Colonos on traditional lands of the Shuar Indigenous people in the 1970s and led to an unusual effort on their part to protect their land. This occurred two decades before Indigenous organizations launched their campaign to promote communal tenure regimes, and Shuar families had no option but to apply for legal title using the administrative procedures of the national colonization agency. This obligated them to deforest small plots within the larger landscapes of their traditional territories.

In 1997, the government allocated funds to improve infrastructure, with the modernization of Route 45, now known as the Troncal Amazónica. Settlement along the highway and into the Amazonian lowlands occurred mainly in the 1970s via development initiatives organized by a regional development entity (CREA) with financing from the IDB. The area now specializes in cattle production and seeks to establish a niche market for high-quality beef for the national market.

A researcher sets up a camera trap in Yasuní National Park in the Ecuadorian Amazon. Image by Jeremy Hance & Tiffany Roufs.

Migration into the southern sector was supported by a regional development organization, but most immigrants came on their own. They included Indigenous Quechua speakers, as well as Ecuadorians of mixed racial heritage, all of whom encroached upon the traditional lands of the Shuar. The super humid climate and rolling topography make intensive cultivation impossible, and the principal economic activity is raising beef and dairy cattle.

In contrast, colonization of the Sucumbíos-Orellano quadrant reflects a proactive settlement policy implemented by the central government after the completion of the highway between Quito and Lago Agrio in 1967. The military government declared Sucumbíos a ‘zone for migration and expansion’ in 1972 and sent teams of surveyors to lay out transects of fifty-hectare plots (250 meters by 2,000 meters) for distribution to new arrivals. The network of nearly identical landholdings was established along a rapidly expanding secondary road network, which was created to support the feeder pipelines that carry crude oil to pumping stations in Lago Agrio.

The soils in the quadrant are relatively fertile, which has allowed for the development of a diverse assemblage of productive systems, including food staples and cash crops such as coffee, cocoa and palm oil. Like other colonization schemes of the 1970s, poor infrastructure and inadequate public services led to widespread disenchantment, and many farmers abandoned their farms. Simultaneously, oil field workers filed claims to acquire plots or purchased abandoned farms from people seeking to leave the region. Many owners adopted a beef production strategy that allowed them to meet the legal requirements for a land claim, but which could be managed by an absentee owner. Consequently, the ethnic makeup of the quadrant is relatively diverse.

The government now seems dedicated to promoting the development of Amazonian Ecuador by embracing the intensification of agricultural production on previously deforested landscapes, while promoting a diversification of production strategies. The government continues to build new oil pipelines and access roads as it expands into new production fields in previously remote landscapes in and around Yasuní National Park. The government’s insistence on developing these assets is highly controversial and a source of conflict with Indigenous groups, particularly the Waorani, whose ancestral territory lies over Ecuador’s most valuable oil reserves.

“A Perfect Storm in the Amazon” is a book by Timothy Killeen and contains the author’s viewpoints and analysis. The second edition was published by The White Horse in 2021, under the terms of a Creative Commons license (CC BY 4.0).

To read earlier chapters of the book, find Chapter One here, Chapter Two here, Chapter Three here, Chapter Four here and Chapter Five here.

Chapter 6. Culture and demographic defines the present