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Migration in the Colombian Amazon was not a state project but a consequence of the army’s armed conflict with the FARC and the emergence of drug trafficking that grew in its shadow.
Although the peace process began in 2017, changes that have occurred since then have given rise to new criminal groups after the guerrillas were eradicated.
Although the Guiana Shield has escaped large-scale deforestation, the region is home to tens of thousands of wildcat gold miners exploiting mineral resources in the thinly populated hinterlands of Venezuela, Guyana, Suriname and French Guiana.

The modern history of internal migration in Colombia began in a manner that was not unlike the processes organized by the governments in Brazil and the other Andean countries in the 1960s and early 1970s. However, that process was derailed first by a civil war and subsequently by the production of illicit drugs, largely because of tactics pursued by the Fuerzas Armada Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). The conflict effectively suppressed state infrastructure investment while freezing land acquisition by middle-class families and investors. At the same time, however, it fuelled the migration of displaced peasants, who opted to cultivate coca under the protective umbrella of the FARC.

The conflict officially ended in 2017 via the so-called Peace Process, which brought momentous change to the Colombian Amazon. The FARC no longer exists as an organized military entity, but it has been replaced by criminal groups composed of demobilized guerillas and militia members. Unfortunately, the state has not established a meaningful presence in the region and the cessation of hostilities has triggered a land rush supercharged by the drug trade and the cattle industry.

*Two young people ride a motorbike on the street that divides Tabatinga in Brazil from Leticia in Colombia. Crime rates have risen sharply in the region. Image by Ivan Brehaut.*

Migratory pathways

Before the civil war, the administration of President Carlos Lleras Restrepo (1966–1970) created the Instituto Nacional de Colonización (INCOR) in an attempt to respond to the demand for land by the rural poor. The strategy was supported by multiple grants from The World Bank, including The Caquetá Land Colonization Project, which sought to expand, organize and support the spontaneous colonization process of settlers moving from Huila in the previous two decades. Unfortunately, these were not particularly successful, although the government support consolidated the now-predominant cattle production model.

Caquetá was both a source and a sink of refugees in the 1980s, as people moved within the country to escape violence. During the 1990s and 2000s, the department was a net source of migrants, as an estimated 100,000 people were forced to vacate approximately 450,000 hectares (1.11 million acres) of land. Many moved to Bogotá. As of 2020, the department of Caquetá had a population of about 300,000 inhabitants, 99 per cent of whom were descendants of immigrants who had moved to the region in the last fifty years.

A similar history explains the settlement of the Colombian Putumayo, which occurred originally in conjunction with the advent of oil exploration and was fed by the movement of individuals from the adjacent Andean highlands. Although cattle ranching occupies the largest area, deforestation was largely driven by coca cultivation during most of the 1990s and 2000s. As in Caquetá, ranchers consolidated smaller landholdings that were originally created by coca farmers.

*A section of cleared forest in the Colombian Andean Amazon, in the department of Putumayo. Image by Natalia Pedraza.*

Migration into Meta and Guaviare in the 1990s and 2000s was almost entirely linked to the production of coca leaf and efforts by the FARC and other militias to extend their influence over the landscapes at the edge of the agricultural frontier. Successive waves of peasant settlers have occupied the landscapes surrounding Parque Nacional Natural Sierra de la Macarena, which the FARC has used as a staging area and refuge since the 1960s.

Their operational tactics changed in the 1980s, when they embraced the illicit drug trade as a source of revenue and actively protected peasant farmers growing coca leaf. Roads did not exist in the forest frontier, nor was it advantageous for coca growers to colonize landscapes accessible by vehicular transport. Consequently, the coca growers and the influence of the FARC expanded by using forest trails and river networks.

The peace process has radically changed this dynamic. Land speculators are financing the relocation of small farmers, who are encouraged to ‘move on’ as their original holdings are consolidated into cattle farms that are now accruing value as the region opens to investment. The central government hopes to limit development in the buffer zones around both Macarena and Chiribiquete national parks, and has limited its infrastructure investment to a limited number of major arteries; however, the local officials and land speculators have been building secondary and tertiary roads at an alarming rate.

*Chiribiquete supplies 60% of the surface water in the entire Colombian Amazon. Image courtesy of the National Natural Parks System of Colombia.*

Venezuela and the Guianas

Successive Venezuelan governments have viewed the natural resources of the Guiana Shield as an economic asset that should be used for national development. This strategy was formulated in the mid-twentieth century and led to the creation of a state-owned enterprise, the Corporacion Venezolana de Guayana (CVG), to develop mineral and hydrological resources. This decentralized, state-owned conglomerate was established in the 1960s and created a variety of subsidiaries dedicated to the mining and processing of iron ore and steel, bauxite and aluminum, and the development of coal and hydropower energy. The state’s presence was further consolidated in the early 1970s, when President Rafael Caldera (1969–1974, 1994–1999) built a modern highway through the southeastern Gran Sabana region to connect with BR-174, which linked Venezuela with the Brazilian Amazon.

Originally, most of the CVG subsidiaries were efficient producers and competed successfully in international mineral markets; however, their viability as business enterprises declined as their mines aged, industrial assets depreciated and national competitiveness eroded because of mismanagement. The administrations of President Hugo Chávez (1999–2013) and his successor, President Nicolás Maduro (2013–present) bankrupted most of these state-owned business enterprises. Nevertheless, migration into the region has continued because of the allure of the ongoing gold rush, facilitated by the military authorities who now oversee development in the southeastern state of Bolívar.

Guyana and Suriname are coastal countries with historical and cultural ties to the island nations of the Caribbean. Economically they are very dependent on their mineral resources, and they apparently view their Amazonian territories as a natural resource to be exploited when opportunities present. Neither country has designated large areas for protection, and their indigenous territorial systems are relatively small. Most land is held in an unallocated forest reserve. The government of Guyana recently has sought to develop an international transport corridor that would link the emerging agricultural landscapes in Roraima, Brazil, with port facilities in Georgetown. This could change the land-use dynamic along that road as settlers create outposts to provide key services to the transport sector.

The borders among Guyana, Suriname and French Guiana have been managed diplomatically among the colonial powers and the independent states that succeeded them. None of these states seems genuinely interested in colonizing their interior provinces. The border between Venezuela and Guyana is the only remaining contested terrestrial border in the Western Hemisphere. The long-simmering dispute over Guyana’s mineral-rich Essequibo region, which never led to armed conflict, flared up again following the 2015 discovery of an offshore oil deposit potentially worth hundreds of billions of dollars.

The floodplains of the Andean piedmont and certain geologically defined landscapes on the Brazilian and Guiana Shield attract tens of thousands of wildcat miners, who employ placer mining technology that is particularly destructive and extraordinarily toxic. Credit: IBAMA & Vincius Mendonça, CC BY-SA 2.0, Flickr.com Ryan M. Bolton, Shutterstock.

Migratory pathways

The Guiana Shield has escaped the large-scale settlement and deforestation that characterize both Amazonian Brazil and Andean countries. This does not mean, however, that it has not been impacted by migration. The region is home to tens of thousands of wildcat gold miners exploiting mineral resources in the thinly populated hinterlands of Venezuela, Guyana, Suriname and French Guiana. These miners are a combination of local inhabitants and fortune-seeking immigrants, mainly Brazilian, whose numbers fluctuate in response to changes in the price of gold. The Suriname government estimates the country has about 20,000 small-scale mining operations, each of which probably employs between five and ten individuals. Most mine owners are native-born Maroons who employ thousands of Brazilian garimpeiros.

It is difficult to know precisely what is transpiring in Venezuela because of the chaotic governance that has characterized the country for the last decade. According to 2011 national census, the municipality of Sifontes had a population of 51,000, but recent reports suggest that this number may have surged to more than 400,000 by 2016. The gold mining region is controlled by the military, which operate numerous mines via joint ventures with Venezuelan businesspeople.

Many of these immigrants may not be gold miners, however, but individuals importing scarce goods from Brazil or seeking to emigrate. At the end of 2022, approximately 70,000 Venezuelans were living in Roraima and Amazonas, with some 33,000 in makeshift shelters and camps. Most, if not all, survive by working in the informal economy.

Banner image: A canoe of Indigenous design in Colombia. Image by J.J. Javier via Nia Tero.

“A Perfect Storm in the Amazon” is a book by Timothy Killeen and contains the author’s viewpoints and analysis. The second edition was published by The White Horse in 2021, under the terms of a Creative Commons license (CC BY 4.0).

To read earlier chapters of the book, find Chapter One here, Chapter Two here, Chapter Three here, Chapter Four here and Chapter Five here.

Chapter 6. Culture and demographic defines the present

In Ecuador, the main areas of colonization were a north-south corridor along the base of the Andes and the Sucumbíos-Orellana quadrant, the country’s major oil-producing region.
Since the 1970s, populations in both areas have grown significantly. The Andean zone went from 160,000 inhabitants to more than 520,000 in 2017; in parallel, the population in the provinces of Sucumbíos and Orellana increased from less than 12,000 to more than 350,000.
Colonization also led to the invasion of lands of the indigenous Shuar, which prompted an unusual effort on their part to protect their territory. Today, the area specializes in cattle production and seeks to establish a niche market for high-quality beef for the domestic market.

Throughout most of the twentieth century, the Ecuadorian authorities pursued a geopolitical strategy that reflected a long-held conviction that they were cheated out of large territories in the Western Amazon. Most of their claims were adjudicated in favor of Peru and they were on the losing side of border disputes in 1860, 1903 and 1941. Consequently, successive governments were intent on not losing another square meter of what they fervently believed was their national territory, a policy that led to the construction of several highways and deliberate policies to foster migration into their lowland provinces.

Peru and Ecuador resolved their differences in 1998, after another border dispute, via an arbitration process coordinated by the governments of Brazil, Argentina, Chile and the United States. In the process, the countries established paired national parks on both sides of the border, and an ambitious IIRSA-sponsored initiative was launched to provide Ecuador with direct access to the Amazon waterway at Puerto Morona. The resolution of the border conflict and the much-improved transportation infrastructure opened up the Cordillera del Condor to large-scale mining operations operated by Canadian and Chinese corporations.

The road network in Amazonian Ecuador closely corresponds to the petroleum pipeline system, partly because the government promoted settlement along service roads during the 1970s. Data sources: GEM (2023) and RAISG (2022).

Migratory pathways

Migration into Amazonian Ecuador has occurred via four highway routes that connect urban centers in the Andes with a town or small city in the lowlands; from north to south, they include Quito to Nueva Loja (E10), Ambato to Puyo (E30), Cuenca to Macas (E40) and Loja to Zamora (E45). These roads channeled migrants into two major colonization landscapes: a north-south corridor along the base of the Andes, and the Sucumbíos-Orellana quadrant, which is also the country’s primary oil-producing region. The population along the piedmont grew from about 160,000 inhabitants in 1970 to more than 520,000 by 2017; simultaneously, the inhabitants of the Sucumbíos and Orellana provinces increased from fewer than 12,000 to more than 350,000.

Most communication was up and down mountain valleys between individual highland and lowland population centers, but eventually these communities were linked by a rudimentary north-south highway (Route 45). Multiple roads extended east into the Amazon lowlands, including one along the border to Tiwinza, a military post on the Santiago River, and an alternative route from the north to connect with Puerto Morona on the Morona River.

This latter route caused significant encroachment by Colonos on traditional lands of the Shuar Indigenous people in the 1970s and led to an unusual effort on their part to protect their land. This occurred two decades before Indigenous organizations launched their campaign to promote communal tenure regimes, and Shuar families had no option but to apply for legal title using the administrative procedures of the national colonization agency. This obligated them to deforest small plots within the larger landscapes of their traditional territories.

In 1997, the government allocated funds to improve infrastructure, with the modernization of Route 45, now known as the Troncal Amazónica. Settlement along the highway and into the Amazonian lowlands occurred mainly in the 1970s via development initiatives organized by a regional development entity (CREA) with financing from the IDB. The area now specializes in cattle production and seeks to establish a niche market for high-quality beef for the national market.

*A researcher sets up a camera trap in Yasuní National Park in the Ecuadorian Amazon. Image by Jeremy Hance & Tiffany Roufs.*

Migration into the southern sector was supported by a regional development organization, but most immigrants came on their own. They included Indigenous Quechua speakers, as well as Ecuadorians of mixed racial heritage, all of whom encroached upon the traditional lands of the Shuar. The super humid climate and rolling topography make intensive cultivation impossible, and the principal economic activity is raising beef and dairy cattle.

In contrast, colonization of the Sucumbíos-Orellano quadrant reflects a proactive settlement policy implemented by the central government after the completion of the highway between Quito and Lago Agrio in 1967. The military government declared Sucumbíos a ‘zone for migration and expansion’ in 1972 and sent teams of surveyors to lay out transects of fifty-hectare plots (250 meters by 2,000 meters) for distribution to new arrivals. The network of nearly identical landholdings was established along a rapidly expanding secondary road network, which was created to support the feeder pipelines that carry crude oil to pumping stations in Lago Agrio.

The soils in the quadrant are relatively fertile, which has allowed for the development of a diverse assemblage of productive systems, including food staples and cash crops such as coffee, cocoa and palm oil. Like other colonization schemes of the 1970s, poor infrastructure and inadequate public services led to widespread disenchantment, and many farmers abandoned their farms. Simultaneously, oil field workers filed claims to acquire plots or purchased abandoned farms from people seeking to leave the region. Many owners adopted a beef production strategy that allowed them to meet the legal requirements for a land claim, but which could be managed by an absentee owner. Consequently, the ethnic makeup of the quadrant is relatively diverse.

The government now seems dedicated to promoting the development of Amazonian Ecuador by embracing the intensification of agricultural production on previously deforested landscapes, while promoting a diversification of production strategies. The government continues to build new oil pipelines and access roads as it expands into new production fields in previously remote landscapes in and around Yasuní National Park. The government’s insistence on developing these assets is highly controversial and a source of conflict with Indigenous groups, particularly the Waorani, whose ancestral territory lies over Ecuador’s most valuable oil reserves.

To read earlier chapters of the book, find Chapter One here, Chapter Two here, Chapter Three here, Chapter Four here and Chapter Five here.

Chapter 6. Culture and demographic defines the present